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COMMENT: PRIVATE EQUITY,
CAPITALISM, AND EFFICIENCY
William H. Coquillette
t
On the panels today, Mr. Reffner and I are the token representa-
tives of darkness in that we are practitioners with large law firms.
Today I will try to give you a sense that partners in large law firms
have feelings, and thus I thought I would talk to you about how I feel
sitting here in front of you.
The first feeling I have is the one of humility because I know
looking around the audience that there are a number of people in at-
tendance who are experts in the areas that we are discussing. If I
really had a serious question about these topics, I would certainly ask
them what their thoughts were.
The second thing I feel is that the presentations thus far have
been rich in information. The first set of speakers provided much
valuable information and insight about the real world of private eq-
uity investing. We had wonderful presentations from two authorities
in that area. Then we have heard some presentations on the academic
side concerning the securities regulation aspects of these activities.
Having spent most of my time on the practical side of all this, I have
learned a lot from reading these academic papers and digesting their
contents.
I also feel that I have had a very rich experience this week, expe-
riencing many different activities characteristic of private equity in-
vesting in our time. Right now I am feeling very challenged trying to
make sense of it all. Let me share with you what I see as happening
in the world around us, how some of the subjects we have been talk-
ing about today relate to those things, and perhaps, as a final thought,
what securities regulation has to do with all of this.
We are seeing a very interesting economy right now, and I will
start by contrasting the economy that we are currently experiencing
with the economy that I learned about in college. If you can believe
it, I was in college back in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that
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time, the view of innovation and the economy from the smartest peo-
ple was basically as follows. The economy was going to be domi-
nated by large corporations, which would get ever larger. Only those
large corporations would have the financial resources to engage in
true innovation. Innovation at that time was viewed as basic research,
which was a very expensive and very long process. It would take
years and millions-only companies like IBM could handle it.
In addition, these large corporations, which were destined to
dominate the landscape, were not very smart. They were not very fast
moving. They would not be effective innovators.
The moral of the discussion was that capitalism was an inferior
economic system and would be eventually outpaced by socialist or
communist economies, which would be much more effective at inno-
vations, innovative business, innovative manufacturing, science, and
so forth.
Now, I can tell you with the hindsight of thirty years that some
of the smartest economists that you will ever meet completely missed
what was going to happen. What actually emerged was the very ro-
bust, dynamic, capitalist, innovative economy which is all around us.
Let me tell you about my week.
Tuesday I drove down to Pittsburgh to see an idea factory. It is
basically a warehouse where a lot of smart people from Carnegie
Mellon University are creating businesses. They think about busi-
nesses, and when they think they have something they work on it a
little bit. If they think it has merit, they set it up as a separate busi-
ness. Then they arrange financing and do other things to make it
grow. They are in the business of creating businesses.
I spent Wednesday and Thursday talking to people in enormous
financial institutions-a couple in Ohio and one in Minnesota-who
are in the business of lending money to people like John Nestor and
the things that they do. Basically those conversations revolved
around how to organize these financial institutions to cover all of the
United States (and perhaps other parts of the world) and how to chan-
nel their capital to the right parts of the private equity activity.
Last night, I attended a closing dinner with venture capitalists
from a number of different cities who had backed a company in Min-
neapolis that is in the business of using the Internet and computer re-
sources to help businesses train employees. This morning at breakfast
I was talking to a man who runs a venture capital firm where all of the
venture capital comes from overseas sources, mostly Asia. These
funds are housed offshore, somewhere in the Caribbean, and they are
invested all over the world with people like the people I visited in
Pittsburgh.
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What is this? This is robust capitalism in its rawest form. It is
innovation being led not by the largest companies, but by small com-
panies that have come together almost on an ad hoc basis; financed
not by pools of capital run by sleepy corporate management, but by.
very supercharged pools of capital collected from all over the world
and managed by people like John Mcllwraith and John Nestor. These
people use this capital to provide enormous value to the economy by
financing innovation and by having the ability to finance very large
projects. One of the important benefits that the economy gets from
these private equity investors (like the two Johns) is not just from
their decisions to back certain projects, but also from their decisions
not to back certain projects. They are highly selective, ruthless deci-
sion-makers in terms of allocating capital. This has the effect of con-
serving capital for the most promising projects. As we are seeing
capitalism in its rawest form, it is very energetic. It is innovative. It
is selective and ruthless. It is a little exciting and a little scary.
One can also understand much of what is going on in the world
today as an enormous drive for greater efficiency in capital markets.
This is one of the things revealed to me by reading Professor Fox's
paper. We see, and hear talk of, evidence of business cycles. Of
course, venture capital experienced cycles in the 1980s and early
1990s. Similar cycles also happened in the leveraged buyout markets.
Such business cycles are in part a reflection of the inefficiency in the
underlying capital markets. But that inefficiency is slowly but surely
being ground out of the system by a lot of smart people thinking
about the regulatory scheme, by the globalization of business taking
away inefficiencies that come from geographic barriers, by the ability
to handle information more efficiently so that it can be beneficial to
businesses and be circulated around the world and different sectors,
and by the ruthlessness of the money that will only back the best
ideas.
We are developing a very large expertise in private equity in-
vesting. Again, John Mclwraith and John Nestor are examples of
this expertise. There are over 800 private equity firms where people
are learning how to do this very kind of investing activity and be-
coming smarter at it as time goes by. This creates greater efficiency
in the markets. As the financial institutions like these big banks are
becoming more adept at running their business, the market is becom-
ing more efficient in financing activity and other kinds of activity.
So the last question I want to ask is: What is the role of securities
regulation in promoting this efficiency, and how does that relate to
this very robust private equity marketplace that we see?
I am not sure that it does have a role. I think that one of the
characteristics of this marketplace in its early stages is to be very non-
public-if I understand the use of the word. One of the things that I
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learned this week reading Professor Fox's paper was that the purpose
of securities regulation is to promote efficiency rather than to protect
investors. I was just thinking about that at a higher level. When we
are talking about a legal system that promotes efficiency, it is almost
as though it is protecting and promoting capitalism. So rather than
having securities laws to protect the widows and the orphans, the se-
curities laws are protecting our system.
I am not sure that the private equity marketplace, where the flow
of funds is from the very smart and ruthless investors, really benefits
from securities regulation. When you get into the public market
where the connection between the business and the investor is more
remote and the balance of power in corporate governance moves from
the investor to the hands of the management, then you are in a situa-
tion where regulation is required to maintain robust capitalism.
As a practitioner, every time that I run into the securities laws in
doing private equity transactions there is big trouble. It usually
means that there is a mischaracterization of "accredited investors." In
the end, the definition of accredited investors is not a good proxy for
what is "non-public" in the private equity area.
So, for example, if you have a fund, sometimes the people that
run the big private equity funds have a "side-by-side fund" where
they invest their money at a little bit cheaper transaction cost than the
people who invest through the main fund. If anybody in that side-by-
side fund is not an accredited investor, such as the junior people
working as professionals for the fund manager, then that creates a
huge problem in the transaction. Too many resources are used up on
other circumstances to police the separation from what is public and
what is non-public. So we may well see a pushing back of securities
regulation from the arena of non-public private equity investments.
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